5 January 2026
Hadhramaut represents the eastern portion of the Republic of Yemen and is its largest governorate. The region is renowned for its oil and gas wealth, as its major fields — in particular the Masila Oil Field — constituted the primary source of Yemeni oil extraction before the war. Prior to the conflict, production from these fields reached approximately 100,000 barrels per day, accounting for nearly 60 % of the national output.
Historically, the region was governed by locally autonomous authorities, first under British colonial rule and later under the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (commonly known as South Yemen). In 1990, it merged with the Yemen Arab Republic (commonly known as North Yemen) to form the Republic of Yemen.
In recent years, tensions have increasingly surfaced across the South. In 2017, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) was established, carrying separatist aspirations and receiving backing from the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Representatives of the Council joined the national unity government formed under the Riyadh Agreement (2019), brokered by Saudi Arabia; however, disagreements persisted. A few weeks ago, the STC announced that it had taken full control of Hadhramaut and Al-Mahrah, effectively calling for an independent South Yemeni state.
This development has raised concerns for the internationally recognized Yemeni government, and Saudi Arabia, which relies on the stability of eastern Yemen to safeguard its southern borders and key maritime routes.
Let us begin by examining Hadhramaut prior to the establishment of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). A careful academic reading of the formation of the Federation of South Arabia (1959–1967) shows that Hadhramaut, although occasionally included in late British political discourse within South Arabia, was not structurally or federatively part of this entity. It remained, until the end of the British presence, administered as an independent territory under what was officially known as the Eastern Aden Protectorate — a clear administrative and political distinction in British documents. Historian Paul Dresch notes in his authoritative work A History of Modern Yemen that the federation effectively encompassed only the colony of Aden and the Western Aden Protectorates, while Hadhramaut remained outside its constitutional and executive institutions, not participating in its parliament or federal government, thus undermining the notion of genuine political integration.
This interpretation is corroborated by the entry Federation of South Arabia in the Encyclopædia Britannica, which explicitly distinguishes the federation’s territories from the protected areas that remained outside it until 1967. Records from the British Colonial Office also support this legal separation, classifying Hadhramaut under the Eastern Aden Protectorate rather than the Federation Territories, as clearly evidenced in the Colonial Office Records (CO 1015, CO 1055) preserved in the British National Archives. Gavin Hambly, in The Cambridge History of the Arab World, further asserts that Hadhramaut never entered the federal experiment and remained a protected sultanate until the Al-Qu’aiti and Al-Kathiri Sultanates were overthrown by revolutionary force following the British withdrawal, rather than through the dissolution of the federation itself.
Anthropological and political studies of Hadhramaut, including the work of R. B. Serjeant, indicate that the region’s social and political structures evolved independently of Aden and the federation, explaining the weak historical integration and the persistence of a sense of regional distinctiveness. Accordingly, according to this academic perspective, Hadhramaut was an eastern protectorate nominally incorporated into the late colonial arrangements without being a functional federative part of South Arabia — a historical distinction that continues to resonate in contemporary political discussions regarding Hadhramaut’s identity and its position within the southern state project.
On the early morning of Friday (2 January 2026), Hadhramaut Governor Salem Al‑Khanbashi announced the launch of a military operation dubbed “Operation Receive the Camps,” aimed at regaining control of military and security sites from the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in a peaceful and organized manner. Upon the commencement of the operation, heavy clashes erupted at the Brigade 37 Camp in Al‑Khasha (in Wadi Hadhramaut), the governorate’s largest military base. After hours of fighting, Al‑Khanbashi declared that the Shield of the Homeland forces—bolstered by the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance led by Amr bin Hubayrish—had taken control of the camp.
The Saudi‑led Arab Coalition’s warplanes supported the government’s advance by striking STC positions in Wadi Hadhramaut. The Yemeni Minister of Information reported that the air raids targeted “STC ambushes” set up along the Shield of the Homeland forces’ route.
On Saturday (3 January), the government announced the successful completion of the operation to secure the camps. State television broadcast statements from Salem Al‑Khanbashi, who reported that groups of STC forces were leaving Mukalla heading toward Aden. He offered a “safe exit” to those wishing to withdraw from Hadhramaut and Al-Mahrah through the governorate’s territory to the south.
In response to the military operations, Southern Transitional Council (STC) President Aidarus al-Zoubaidi announced the launch of a two-year transitional phase intended to pave the way for a referendum on southern independence. Meanwhile, STC Vice President Ahmed Saeed bin Breik called for popular mobilization in Hadhramaut to confront the “forthcoming invasion” by the Northern forces, as he termed it. At the same time, political communications continued: Presidential Council Chairman Rashad al-Alimi invited Saudi Arabia to host a comprehensive conference on the southern issue, including the participation of all components, notably the STC.
From the foregoing, the assessment of field developments in eastern Yemen, particularly in Hadhramaut, constitutes a fundamental entry point for understanding the reconfiguration of power balances within the broader Yemeni landscape. The significance of these developments extends beyond their direct military dimension, encompassing political, security, and strategic implications—both in terms of relations among local actors and within the wider conflict with the Houthi movement, as well as their impact on the calculations of regional backers supporting each side.
Recent developments in Hadhramaut have demonstrated the Yemeni government’s ability, with direct support from Saudi Arabia, to regain the field initiative in the governorate. Government forces, reinforced by local tribes, succeeded in reasserting control over all military sites, resulting in a decline of the Southern Transitional Council’s (STC) influence within the province, while maintaining local governance structures in their pre-December 2025 configuration. This shift reflects a partial restoration of military and political balance in favor of the government in eastern Yemen. However, this progress may entail a temporary strategic cost, potentially allowing the Houthis to exploit the government’s preoccupation to reorganize their positions or achieve subsequent field gains
These developments in the balance of power in eastern Yemen cannot be understood in isolation from their broader implications for the political structure of the Yemeni conflict as a whole. The events reveal imbalances within internal alliances, the nature of the relationship among the components of the internationally recognized Yemeni government (the legitimacy), and the processes for managing disputes among competing visions regarding the shape and future of the state. This necessitates viewing the general Yemeni landscape as the broader framework in which these developments intersect and within which their political and strategic consequences take shape.
Within this broader context, recent developments have highlighted the depth of structural divisions within the camp of the internationally recognized Yemeni government (the legitimacy). A clear divergence has emerged between northern components and forces aligned with the Presidential Council on one side, and a southern actor advocating a separatist agenda represented by the forces of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) on the other. The STC’s elevation of its demands toward independence has brought the southern issue back to the forefront of the political agenda, while the Yemeni government insists on addressing this issue through political and institutional channels rather than imposing new field realities.
This divergence of visions has complicated prospects for reaching a comprehensive political settlement, given the fundamental conflict between the unified state project championed by the government and the separatist aspirations promoted by the STC. Conversely, the government’s reassertion of control over Hadhramaut has thwarted an operational attempt to reshape the political map by force, temporarily reinforcing the state’s position and curbing the momentum of disintegrationist projects. However, the widening rift within the Arab Coalition, particularly between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), remains a constraining factor for any sustained strategic progress, as it may weaken joint efforts against the Houthi movement and divert attention from the broader strategic goal of ending the war and restoring stability in Yemen.
The eastern region of Yemen holds multiplied strategic significance due to its geographic position overlooking the Arabian Sea, serving as a vital extension of the Indian Ocean and an indirect link between the Arabian Gulf and the eastern Red Sea. This makes it part of a maritime corridor system that is highly sensitive for international trade and energy security. Any prolonged tensions in this region reduce the government’s capacity to effectively monitor these corridors, creating opportunities for non-state actors to influence maritime security.
Beyond its maritime dimension, Hadhramaut’s oil and gas fields constitute a fundamental pillar of Yemen’s energy infrastructure, supported by a maritime export network that renders the governorate’s stability crucial for the protection of facilities and supply lines. In this context, the consolidation of government control contributes to mitigating risks of targeting or sabotage, whereas the rising influence of irregular armed groups could expose this vital infrastructure to looting or deliberate disruption.
In the short term, the prospects for conditional de-escalation appear elevated following the government’s reassertion of field control, particularly amid Gulf-led mediation efforts, likely to materialize through the forthcoming Riyadh conference involving southern components. Within this framework, the government may succeed in consolidating its security and administrative presence in Hadhramaut and Al-Mahrah, while some southern leaders might adopt a pragmatic approach based on political maneuvering, provided guarantees are secured concerning the development of decentralized governance frameworks or the opening of political and economic rights issues for southern and eastern Yemen within an organized negotiation process. However, this path remains threatened by hardline elements within the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which may insist on full independence, raising the possibility of renewed tensions through popular protests or limited armed actions that maintain a state of instability.
In the medium term, the current crisis may lead to tangible shifts in the structure of authority in Yemen, particularly if the Riyadh negotiations yield a partial settlement, such as the enhancement of local authorities’ powers in the southern governorates or the reintroduction of a southern region framework within a more balanced power-sharing arrangement. If such an agreement is reached, the peak of the dispute may temporarily recede; however, the fragility of the national contract would persist, leaving open the possibility of structural disintegration of the Yemeni state. In a scenario of continued division, the option of an independent southern state may be reconsidered by some local actors, despite regional and international opposition. Conversely, the internationally recognized government would seek to consolidate state sovereignty through hard power, deploying Shield of the Homeland forces, which could result in a redrawing of internal zones of influence and the creation of new power balances by force.
At the regional level, the deepening of internal fissures may prompt a realignment of alliances. Saudi Arabia is expected to bolster its support for the government and its political allies, as any reduction in the intensity of Yemen’s internal divisions directly impacts the security of strategic maritime corridors in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, as well as the stability of Gulf energy supply lines—intersecting with the interests of major regional and international powers.
Ultimately, Yemen will remain hostage to its complex internal entanglements, with its stability dependent on the ability of local actors to produce a political settlement based on dialogue and consensus, rather than on imposing realities by force. The next two years are likely to constitute a decisive crossroads, with outcomes ranging from the initiation of a gradual reconciliation process among the parties—potentially under direct regional sponsorship—to the deepening of fragmentation, resulting in the emergence of competing entities on the Yemeni map. In either case, the repercussions of this trajectory will extend beyond Yemen’s borders, affecting the security of neighboring countries, particularly in terms of protecting borders and vital maritime corridors.
What is of particular interest are the component-based divisions and local alignments. Positions regarding the conflict appear divided into two main groups. The first consists of tribal alliances supporting the government, which publicly declared full backing for the decisions of the Presidential Leadership Council and the central government, holding the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and its backers responsible for military escalation. Footage from government sources showed the Hadhramaut Protection Forces—tribal units—reclaiming military sites held by the STC in Mukalla, indicating that many influential tribes effectively joined efforts to uphold local authority.
The second group is represented by the STC and its forces in Hadhramaut. The STC has recently brought the southern coast and valley under its control, yet tribal and regional loyalties among its members from Hadhramaut appear weak or limited.
Local reactions have reflected the extent of concern over Hadhramaut sliding toward social fracture. Observers have warned that the recent conflict could undermine the rare social cohesion that has characterized the governorate, particularly as the vast majority of Hadhramaut’s society has, throughout the years of war, engaged in political and social activity through peaceful means, avoiding violence. These concerns were reinforced by warnings from prominent local leaders that Hadhramaut is experiencing one of its most perilous phases in decades amid ongoing escalation, highlighting the risks of slipping into an open internal conflict with no clear victor.
These anxieties have materialized in the form of escalating rhetoric and violence, with some officials expressing regret that slogans have shifted from a logic of inclusive national struggle to exclusionary rhetoric, effectively leading to internal clashes among members of the same community. At the same time, explicit threats have been issued by tribal leaders to use force to expel rivals from Hadhramaut territories. This parallel trajectory of rhetorical and field mobilization points to a clear fissure in the social fabric, exacerbated by incidents of mutual killings and the widening scope of clashes between the valley and the coast.
With all parties aware of the risks of this drift, continuing military and security measures without an inclusive political and social framework threatens to transform the crisis from a transient confrontation into a protracted internal conflict, potentially opening the door to a local civil war that would be difficult to contain if this escalating dynamic is not urgently curbed.
The immediate impact of these divisions has manifested in security breakdowns and local disorder, as the sudden withdrawal of some armed groups created vacuums in multiple military and official sites, leaving them vulnerable to looting and sabotage, and generating a widespread sense of insecurity among residents. This situation has endangered the safety of civilians and their property, and in the medium term, these repercussions may materialize in further collapse of health and education systems, disruption of humanitarian aid delivery, and limited internal displacement that could expand if tensions persist. In this context, Hadhramaut’s resources—historically a source of stability and development—face the risk of becoming a source of conflict and depletion, imposing on the local community a humanitarian and economic burden far exceeding the immediate costs of the current military confrontation.
Containing social divisions in Hadhramaut and preventing their slide into open internal conflict requires a multi-level approach, foremost of which is initiating an inclusive local dialogue based on genuine reconciliation initiatives, involving social and tribal leaders as the historical safeguard of Hadhramaut’s stability. Local figures and social authorities have emphasized that maintaining Hadhramaut’s unity represents a top priority at this stage, urging tribal sheikhs and community notables to play their role in calming tensions and opening channels of communication that address disputes outside the logic of force and arms.
In this context, the Hadhramaut National Council has emerged as a locally representative framework, attempting to formulate an alternative vision based on administrative and economic autonomy for Hadhramaut within the Yemeni state, enabling fairer management of resources and mitigating feelings of marginalization that fuel conflicts.
At the regional level, Saudi calls to convene a dialogue conference in Riyadh, bringing together the various southern components, assume particular significance as an effort to return contentious issues to the political track, amid repeated Gulf warnings about the risks of military escalation and its implications for regional stability. Observers anticipate that these efforts may create a political space that offsets security vacuums, preventing further damage to the social fabric.
Concurrently, constructive humanitarian measures—such as ensuring safe withdrawals and reducing cycles of retaliatory action—can help lower tensions and create a less hostile environment for dialogue. Yet, sustainable resolution remains contingent on long-term steps addressing the root causes of fragmentation, foremost among them ensuring genuine Hadhramaut participation in managing its oil resources, rebuilding local state institutions on professional foundations, and strengthening economic development pathways.
In this sense, analysts converge on the view that containing the division can only be achieved through a tribal-based local reconciliation rooted in state legitimacy, supported by comprehensive southern dialogue and sincere regional cooperation, preventing Hadhramaut from being turned into a battleground imposed from outside at the expense of the stability of its society and the future of its citizens...
